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Introduction	According	to	the	substantialist,	substances	should	be	regarded	as	the	fundamental	ontological	category.	It	is	substances	that	are	the	bearer	of	properties,	that	are	causally	efficacious	and	that	compose	the	things	we	see	and	touch	around	us.	Cumpa	has	argued	that	this	metaphysics	fits	poorly	with	classical	physics	(2014)	and	Buonomo	has	extended	this	argument	into	the	quantum	realm.	After	reviewing	their	claims,	I	shall	argue	that	simple	reflection	on	the	form	of	the	Standard	Model	also	undermines	substantialism.	I	will	then	explore	Dasgupta’s	qualitative	factualism	in	this	context	before	suggesting	that	modern	physics	does	not	compel	us	to	adopt	such	a	stance.	The	alternative	is	to	adopt	a	form	of	structuralism	which,	although	it	may	be	rendered	compatible	with	factualism,	can	also	stand	as	a	‘third	way’	between	these	stances.		
Substantialism	According	to	the	substantialist,	‘Substance	and	properties	are	basic,	indeed	the	basic	ontological	categories.’	(Heil	2012,	pp.	3-4).	Indeed,	they	may	be	thought	of	as	complementary	categories,	so	substances	are	the	bearers	of	properties	and	properties	are	the	way	that	substances	are	(ibid.).	If	you	add	the	requirement	that	whatever	ultimately	bears	properties	must	be	metaphysically	simple	(ibid.,	p.	20),	you	must	conclude	that	substances	are	metaphysical	simples.	Substances,	on	this	view,	are	the	metaphysical	‘fundamental	building	blocks’	(ibid.	p.	41).	If	you	then	argue	that	whatever	one	takes	to	be	metaphysically	fundamental	should	align	with	that	which	we	take	to	be	physically	fundamental,	you	will	further	conclude	that	the	fundamental	building	blocks	of	physics	–	whether	they	are	taken	to	be	particles,	or	fields,	or	superstrings	or	whatever	–	must	be	substances	(ibid.,	p.	5).			 Thus,	on	this	view	the	electron,	for	example,	is	a	substance	that	possesses	certain	properties,	such	as	(rest)	mass,	charge	and	spin.	A	particular	(rest)	mass,	charge	and	spin	is	the	way	the	electron,	as	a	substance,	is.	What	this	yields	is	a	‘bottom-up’	account,	according	to	which	we	start,	ontologically,	with	these	fundamental	simples	as	substances	and	work	our	way	up	through	the	various	‘levels’	of	reality,	from	the	fundamental	to	the	‘everyday’.	So,	if	we	further	conceive	of	properties	as	powers,	or	dispositions,	the	fundamental	substances	come	to	be	seen	as	the	‘seats’	of	such	powers	–	an	electron,	for	example,	is	the	seat	of	an	assortment	of	causal	powers	as	expressed	through	the	above	properties	(one	might	hesitate	at	regarding	spin	as	causal	but	the	recent	development	of	spintronics	could	be	deployed	to	assuage	such	doubts).	Working	our	way	up,	we	can	then	appeal	to	suitable	accounts	of	composition	or	emergence	or	some	such,	to	arrive	at	the	entities	that	we	take	to	populate	the	‘everyday’	level.		
	 To	many	this	is	an	appealing	picture	but	Cumpa	raises	the	following	criticism	(2014)	based	on	a	proposed	criterion	for	fundamental	categories	that	runs	as	follows:		For	every	x,	x	is	the	fundamental	category	of	the	world	if	and	only	if	x	has	explanatory	power	to	account	for	the	relation	between	the	ordinary	world	and	the	physical	universe.	(Cumpa	2014:	p.	320)			This	requires	that	any	candidate	for	fundamentality	must	be	‘cross-sectional’	in	the	sense	of	crossing	or	bridging	the	two	levels	–	that	of	the	‘ordinary	world’	and	that	of	the	‘physical	universe’.	Unfortunately,	Cumpa	argues,	the	above	substantialist	account	fails	to	meet	this	criterion,	essentially	because	it	fails	to	be	cross-sectional.	Thus,	consider	this	table	at	which	I	am	sitting:	we	might	think	that	the	solidity	of	the	table	is	a	property	of	it.	But	according	to	the	above	account,	only	fundamental	simples	can	be	considered	to	be	substances	and	only	these	truly	possess	properties.	The	solidity	of	the	table	is	not	a	property	per	se,	it	is	merely	a	consequence	of	the	arrangement	of	fundamental	substances;	that	is,	‘…	what	you	get	when	you	arrange	these	substances	in	this	way.’	(Heil	2012,	p.	7).	Thus	by	virtue	of	situating	substances	and	properties	only	at	the	fundamental	level,	this	sort	of	account	cannot	satisfy	Cumpa’s	criterion.	As	Buonomo	puts	it,		…		if	ordinary	substances	and	ordinary	accidents	are	nothing	but	substances	and	properties	by	courtesy,	this	kind	of	explanation	of	the	fundamental	level	of	the	world	consists	in	the	elimination	of	the	ordinary	level	of	things	as	far	as	the	fundamental	categories	are	concerned.	As	a	consequence,	if	the	ordinary	world	is	omitted	by	the	categorial	discourse,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	the	category	of	substance	may	account	for	the	complex	world.	(Buonomo	2017;	published	online,	no	page	numbers)		Furthermore,	according	to	Buonomo,	things	get	worse	for	the	substantialist	account	when	we	take	quantum	physics	into	account.	So,	consider	quantum	‘entanglement’,	which	arises,	for	example,	when	we	have	two	particles	that	interact		-	quantum	mechanics	will	ascribe	a	state	to	the	system	as	a	whole,	such	that	the	two	particles	cannot	be	said	to	have	distinct	states.	This	form	of	‘holism’	results	in	certain	non-classical	correlations	being	exhibited	between	measurements	made	on	the	particles	(e.g.	of	their	spin)	and	these	correlations	have	now	been	experimentally	verified	in	various	ways.	This	forces	some	revision	of	the	rather	simplistic	substantialist	metaphysics	above,	whereby	the	particles	are	the	fundamental	property	possessing	substances	that	then	compose	various	wholes,	running	through	the	levels	from	atoms	to	molecules	and	eventually	to	tables	...	The	extent	of	such	revisions	may	be	debatable.	But	if	we	take	entanglement	to	imply	that,	for	example,	the	state	of	the	whole	cannot	be	said	to	supervene	on	those	of	the	particles	(Teller	1986)	or,	at	the	very	least,	that	the	former	cannot	be	said	to	depend	upon	the	latter,	then	it	is	clear	that	standard	notions	of	composition,	for	example,	insofar	as	they	metaphysically	ride	on	the	back	of	such	dependence,	are	going	to	have	difficulty	in	accommodating	this	feature	of	the	quantum	world.			 As	a	result,	some	substantialists	have	taken	what	some	might	see	as	a	rather	drastic	position	and	adopted	a	form	of	monism,	according	to	which,	
‘[p]articles	would	be	abstractions	in	the	sense	that	a	billiard	ball’s	redness	would	be	an	abstraction,	a	way	the	billiard	ball	is	…’	(Heil	2012:	p.	48;	cf.	Schaffer	2010)1	However,	Buonomo	identifies	a	number	of	difficulties	with	such	a	move:	first,	it	yields	a	conflict	between	classical	and	quantum	metaphysics,	wherein	according	to	the	former	electrons,	say,	are	substances	but	according	to	the	latter	they	are	not	–	indeed	they	are	regarded	as	properties,	with	the	holistic,	entangled	state	understood	as	substantival.2	Of	course,	the	substantialist	could	simply	give	priority	to	the	quantum	account	but	the	worry	then,	is	that	to	dismiss	the	classical	view	in	this	way	would	further	clash	with	the	way	that	classical	physics	continues	to	be	used	at	the	macroscopic	level	in	all	sorts	of	ways.	Furthermore,	quantum	physics	cannot	be	taken	as	our	‘Theory	of	Everything’,	not	least	because	of	the	well-known	issues	regarding	its	unification	with	General	Relativity.			 The	second	difficulty	is	that,	in	general,	‘…the	substance-property	division	recognized	by	a	substantialist	ontology	has	unclear	results	when	applied	to	quantum	physics.’	(Buonomo	2017)	So,	for	example,	if	we	take	the	monistic	version	of	substantialism	sketched	above,	the	universe	as	a	whole,	understood	quantum	mechanically,	would	be	the	(only)	substance	but	then	it	is	not	clear	what	are	this	substance’s	properties.	If	these	are	taken	to	be	the	particles	themselves,	then	how	are	we	to	understand	what	we	usually	take	to	be	the	properties	of	these,	such	as	(rest)	mass,	charge,	spin	etc.?	If	we	take	these	not	to	be	properties	then	we	have	another	clash	with	the	classical	view.	If	we	take	them	to	be	properties	of	properties,	then	the	substantialist	owes	us	an	account	of	how	to	make	sense	of	this	idea.	Perhaps	we	should	regard	them	as	‘pseudo-’properties	like	the	solidity	of	my	table,	but	they	certainly	do	not	feature	at	the	‘everyday’	level	in	the	way	the	latter	does	(ibid.).			 However,	even	if	the	substantialist	could	respond	to	the	above	problems,	there	is	a	final	objection	that	is	taken	to	be	‘lethal’:	such	a	monistic	account	fails	to	meet	Cumpa’s	cross-sectionality	criterion	above,	since,	again,	the	category	of	substance	and	its	complement,	that	of	property,	refer	to	only	one	level,	that	of	the	scientific	universe,	and	hence	fail	to	bridge	the	gap	between	that	and	the	everyday	world	(Buonomo	2017).			 Now,	the	substantialist	may	have	the	means	to	respond	to	these	concerns,	more	or	less	straightforwardly.	Consider	again	the	purported	conflict	between	the	classical	and	quantum	accounts.	Given	the	naturalistic	demand	that	we	tailor	our	metaphysics	to	fit	our	science,	and	given	the	apparent	conflict	between	classical	and	quantum	physics,	it	is	hard	to	avoid	the	conclusion	that	some	consideration	will	have	to	be	given	as	to	the	relationship	between	the	two	metaphysical	pictures.	So,	one	option	would	be	for	the	substantialist	to	accept	that	classical	mechanics	‘works’,	in	some	sense,	at	the	macroscopic	level	(however	that	is	defined)	and	thus	can	be	considered	pragmatically	true	or	partially	true	or	whatever	(da	Costa	and	French	2003)	at	that	level,	but	that	this	does	not	justify	rejecting	the	quantum	substantialist	metaphysics.	Indeed,	one	might	expect	the	emergence	of	an	appropriate	metaphysics	for	the	level	of	‘everyday’	objects	to	follow	the	broad	contours	of	the	shift	from	truth	in	the																																																									1	Alternatively	one	might	adopt	some	form	of	emergence	and	argue	that	entangled	systems	are	emergent	entities	(Humphreys	2016).	2	Cumpa	(2019)	argues	that	the	substantialist	position	faces	the	threat	of	losing	internal	coherency	on	this	point:	either	electrons,	say,	are	genuine	substances	or	genuine	properties.			
standard	sense	at	the	fundamental	level	to	pragmatic	or	partial	truth	at	that	of	the	everyday.			 Alternatively,	she	could	follow	Cartwright	(1999)	in	adopting	a	‘patchwork’	form	of	realism,	according	to	which	classical	and	quantum	physics	are	both	true,	but	in	distinct	domains.	If	the	latter	are	taken	to	correspond	to	these	levels	we’ve	been	talking	about	then	the	substantialist	could	propose	a	‘patchwork’	metaphysics	according	to	which	both	entities	to	which	classical	mechanics	is	taken	to	apply	–	such	as	tables	–	and	those	to	which	quantum	mechanics	is	taken	to	apply	–	such	as	electrons	–	are	deemed	to	be	substances,	where	this	category	is	acknowledged	to	be	domain	or	level	specific.	That's	obviously	quite	a	radical	suggestion	and	one	that	perhaps	doesn't	sit	so	comfortably	with	the	overall	idea	of	fundamentality.			 A	further	alternative	would	be	to	simply	insist	that	even	though	classical	mechanics	‘works’	in	some	sense	at	the	everyday	level,	this	does	not	preclude	one	arguing	that	quantum	mechanics	actually	applies	across	the	board	and	hence	the	metaphysics	associated	with	classical	physics	can,	in	fact,	be	dismissed.	Note	first	of	all,	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	quantum	physics	is	only	confined	to	the	‘microscopic’	level,	however	that	is	defined.	There	are	a	number	of	very	well-known	and	quite	striking	quantum	phenomena	at	the	macroscopic	level,	involving	superconductivity	or	‘superfluid’	behaviour,	in	general.	Note	also	that	we	can	give	some	account	of	how	we	can	recover	apparently	classical	behaviour	on	quantum	mechanical	grounds	via	the	physics	of	decoherence	(Bacciagaluppi	2016).	Given	all	of	that,	the	substantialist	could	maintain	that	the	metaphysics	associated	with	quantum	mechanics	is,	in	fact,	the	fundamental	one	and	that	it	can	accommodate	apparently	classical	behaviour	in	a	context	dependent	way	–	by,	for	example,	allowing	that	we	obtain	the	appearance	associated	with	a	classical	substantialist	metaphysics	through	the	decoherence	mechanism.			 As	for	the	concern	about	quantum	mechanics	not	being	the	final	Theory	of	Everything,	that	surely	is	a	sweeping	concern	that	would	apply	to	any	theory	at	this	stage	of	the	development	of	physics.	And	granted	the	problems	associated	with	unifying	it	with	General	Relativity,	it	remains	by	far	the	best	theory	we	have	at	this	level.	Plus,	of	course,	whatever	theory	we	eventually	end	up	with,	we	would	expect	it	to	degenerate	into	quantum	mechanics	in	the	relevant	domain,	e.g.	at	distances	greater	than	the	Planck	scale	and	for	which	gravitational	effects	can	be	ignored.		 The	second	difficulty	above	can	be	dealt	with	by	cutting	out	the	metaphysical	middleman,	as	it	were.	We	recall	that	the	worry	is	that	by	taking	the	universe,	understood	holistically,	as	the	(quantum)	substance	and	particles	as	non-substances,	or	properties,	it	becomes	unclear	how	we	are	to	regard	what	we	would	typically	take	to	be	the	properties	of	these	particles.	However,	if	we	regard	particles	as	nothing	but	particular	clusters	of	such	properties	then	the	worry	about	how	we	are	to	understand	properties-of-properties	simply	evaporates.	Of	course,	there	remains	the	issue	of	why	those	specific	properties	happen	to	cluster	together	in	the	way	that	they	do;	that	is,	why	that	specific	(rest)mass,	charge	and	spin	associated	with	the	electron,	say,	happen	to	occur	together.	But	its	not	clear	how	invoking	substance	at	this	level	helps	with	that	–	after	all,	we	can	still	ask	what	is	it	about	that	substance	that	leads	those	specific	properties	to	cluster	together.	Of	course,	we	can	always	answer	that	this	is	a	primitive	feature	of	our	metaphysics	(Heil	2012)	but	if	we	drop	the	idea	of	
particles	as	substances,	and	take	them	to	be	clusters	of	properties,	we	could	appeal	to	something	like	Chakravartty’s	notion	of	‘sociability’	(2007)	to	metaphysically	explain	why	those	specific	properties	appear	together	as	they	do.	On	this	picture,	then,	we	have	the	universe	as	one	substance,	with	properties	that	cluster	together	in	certain	ways	to	give	what	we	call	‘particles’.	Of	course,		appealing	to	‘sociability’	may	seem	an	ad	hoc	move	but	perhaps	this	is	where	we	reach	the	limits	of	our	naturalism.			 The	final	difficulty	above	repeats	Cumpa’s	concern.	Let	us	recall	its	origin	in	the	insistence	that	for	something	to	be	a	fundamental	category,	it	must	be	able	to	account	for	the	relation	between	the	ordinary	world	and	the	physical	universe.	The	requisite	notion	of	‘cross-sectionality’	can	then	be	expressed	in	‘strong’	and	‘weak’	forms:		‘Strong’	cross-sectionality:	something	is	a	fundamental	category	if	it	can	account	for	the	relation	between	the	‘ordinary	world’	and	the	‘physical	universe’	by	virtue	of	appearing,	as	a	category,	in	both	the	‘ordinary	world’	and	the	‘physical	universe’.			‘Weak’	cross-sectionality:	something	is	a	fundamental	category	if	it	can	account,	
in	some	manner,	for	the	relation	between	the	‘ordinary	world’	and	the	‘physical	universe’.			Substance	is	not	strongly	cross-sectional	because	in	the	quantum	mechanical	context	it	cannot	feature	in	both	the	‘ordinary	world’	and	the	‘physical	universe’.	However	it	is	weakly	cross-sectional	insofar	as	an	account	can	be	given	of	the	relation	between	the	physical	universe	and	the	ordinary	world,	where	that	account,	as	metaphysics,	rides	naturalistically	on	the	back	of	the	relevant	physics,	in	terms	of	decoherence	or	whatever	(for	additional	concerns,	however,	see	Cumpa	2019).			 Unfortunately,	there	is	a	further	argument	that	can	be	deployed	and	which	I	think	is	decisive.	This	draws	on	the	role	of	symmetries	in	modern	physics,	as	exemplified	by	the	so-called	‘Standard	Model’	in	elementary	particle	physics.		
Substance	and	the	Standard	Model	Let	us	quickly	review	the	Standard	Model:		famously,	it	encompasses	the	electromagnetic,	the	weak	nuclear	and	the	strong	nuclear	interactions	(but	not,	crucially,	gravity)	and	classifies	all	known	elementary	particles.	At	its	heart	sits	certain	kinds	of	symmetries	that	have	become	a	prominent	feature	in	the	development	of	physics	over	the	last	hundred	years	or	so.	Indeed,	Weinberg	writes,	in	reflecting	on	the	development	of	the	Standard	Model,		…	we	did	have	a	valuable	key	to	nature’s	secrets.	The	laws	of	nature	evidently	obeyed	certain	principles	of	symmetry,	whose	consequences	we	could	work	out	and	compare	with	observation,	even	without	a	detailed	theory	of	particles	and	forces.	There	were	symmetries	that	dictated	that	certain	distinct	processes	all	go	at	the	same	rate,	and	that	also	dictated	the	existence	of	families	of	distinct	particles	that	all	have	the	same	mass.	Once	we	observed	such	equalities	of	rates	or	of	masses,	we	could	infer	the	existence	of	a	symmetry,	and	this	we	thought	would	give	us	a	clearer	idea	of	the	further	observations	
that	should	be	made,	and	of	the	sort	of	underlying	theories	that	might	or	might	not	be	possible.	(Weinberg	2011)			Thus	symmetries	serve	a	crucially	important	heuristic	role	and,	partly	as	a	result,	have	been	cemented	into	the	fabric	of	the	model	itself.			 Now	what	does	this	have	to	do	with	substantialism?	Well,	recall	the	picture	outline	in	the	previous	section:	classically,	it's	a	‘bottom-up’	account	in	which	we	begin	with	elementary	particles	as	the	fundamental	substances	that	possess	the	relevant	properties.	However,	the	Standard	Model	gives	a	very	different	picture,	in	which	the	relevant	properties	‘drop	out’	of	the	symmetries.	Lets	see	how	it	works.		 We	begin	with	Permutation	Symmetry,	which	lies	at	the	very	core	of	quantum	theory	and	is	associated	with	the	so-called	indistinguishability	of	quantum	particles.	It	is	represented	mathematically	by	the	permutation	group	(see	French	and	Krause	2006)	and	divides	up	the	space	of	states	in	quantum	mechanics	(the	Hilbert	space)	into	distinct	sectors,	each	corresponding	to	a	certain	fundamental	kind	of	particle,	the	two	most	well	known	being	fermions,	which	obey	Fermi-Dirac	statistics	and	bosons,	obeying	Bose-Einstein	statistics.	The	former	includes	electrons	and	protons	etc.,	the	latter	includes	photons,	for	example,	and	their	behaviour	in	aggregate	is	very	different:	putting	it	crudely,	bosons	tend	to	cluster	together,	whereas	fermions	tend	to	stay	apart.	There	are	other	kinds	that	are	possible,	corresponding	to	so-called	para-particles	but	although	it	was	suggested	that	quarks	could	obey	parastatistics,	this	idea	was	eventually	dropped	(French	1995).	The	point	is,	the	most	fundamental	kinds	into	which	elementary	particles	can	be	divided,	effectively	‘drop	out’	of	the	imposition	of	this	symmetry.			 The	Standard	Model	also	incorporates	the	global	Poincaré	symmetry	that	is	a	feature	of	all	relativistic	quantum	field	theories	and	which	is	a	symmetry	of	Minkowski	space-time.	As	Wigner	famously	showed,	this	generates	a	classification	of	all	elementary	particles	in	terms	of	their	mass	and	spin.		Hence	these	fundamental	properties	can	also	be	said	to	‘drop	out’	of	this	particular	symmetry.	Finally,	there	is	the	local	SU(3)	x	SU(2)	x	U(1)	gauge	symmetry	that	effectively	characterises	this	particular	model	and	covers	the	fundamental	interactions	of	the	strong,	weak	and	electromagnetic	forces,	respectively.	Gauge	symmetry	refers	to	the	way	in	which	the	mathematical	expression	of	the	system’s	dynamics	remains	invariant	under	a	group	of	transformations,	where	the	‘gauge’	aspect	denotes	certain	redundant	degrees	of	freedom	in	that	expression.	The	generator	of	this	group	of	transformations	represents	a	field	and	when	such	a	field	is	quantised,	we	get	certain	gauge	particles	(bosons)	that	‘carry’	the	interaction.	Thus,	in	the	case	of	electrodynamics,	the	relevant	gauge	symmetry	group	associated	with	the	property	of	charge	is	U(1)	and	the	requirement	of	gauge	invariance	yields	the	photon	as	the	corresponding	gauge	boson.	Thus,	again,	certain	kinds	of	particles	‘drop	out’	of	a	symmetry	principle.			 Notice	how	this	is	very	much	a	‘top-down’	sort	of	framework:	it	is	the	symmetries	that	yield	the	properties	of	the	particles	–	from	the	kind	of	particle	they	are	to	their	specific	properties	like	spin	–	rather	than	thinking	of	them	as	possessed	by	the	particles	as	substances.	Now,	of	course,	the	substantialist	view	of	quantum	theory	is	also	top-down	in	the	sense	that	all	such	monist	accounts	
are:	here,	we	begin	with	the	universe	as	a	whole,	understood	as	a	quantum	system	in	an	entangled	state,	which	is	then	taken	to	possess	certain	properties.	But	of	course,	the	latter	picture	does	not	incorporate	these	symmetries,	nor	the	manner	in	which	properties	‘drop	out’	from	them.		 With	regard	to	that	first	point,	the	substantialist	could	argue	along	the	following	lines:	the	universe,	as	an	entangled	quantum	system,	evolves	according	to	Schrödinger’s	equation,	understood	as	the	overall	fundamental	law	of	quantum	theory	and	the	symmetries	can	then	be	taken	to	be	constraints	on	the	derivative	laws	formed	from	that	equation	by	plugging	an	expression	of	the	relevant	dynamics	into	it.	However,	it	remains	unclear	how	the	properties	concerned	can	be	said	to	both	‘drop	out’	of	the	symmetries	and	be	possessed	by	the	universe	qua	quantum	system.	Of	course,	how	this	‘dropping	out’	of	kinds	and	properties	and	particles	is	to	be	captured	in	terms	of	some	metaphysical	framework	remains	to	be	discussed	(see	Cumpa	and	French,	forthcoming).	One	option	is	to	deploy	the	language	of	determinables	and	determinates,	so	that	the	symmetries	would	be	the	determinables	of	which	the	properties	are	the	determinates	(see	French	2014).	But	again	it	is	not	clear	how	this	would	be	of	any	use	for	the	substantialist.		 	
Factualism	Cumpa	and	Buonomo	take	the	rejection	of	substantialism	to	make	metaphysical	room	for	factualism.	This	is	the	view	that,	as	the	name	suggests,	facts,	or	states-of-affairs	are	the	most	fundamental	category.	There	is,	of	course,	a	huge	literature	on	the	relationship	between	facts	and	objects	with	their	properties	but	here	I	will	just	note	that	a	constitutional	relationship	immediately	allows	for	the	criterion	of	cross-sectionality	to	be	met:		Consider	once	again	the	brown	table	in	front	of	us.	It	seems	to	me	that	we	could	regard	the	perceptual	entity	as	a	fact,	namely,	the	fact	that	this	table	(the	table	in	front	of	us)	is	brown.	We	can	consider	the	arrangement	of	particles	of	which	the	table	consists	and	its	perceptual	properties	as	the	two	constituents	of	the	fact.	Since	I	grant	ontological	status	to	the	ordinary	world	and	the	physical	universe,	I	think	that	it	is	clear	that	the	division	between	facts	and	constituents	is	cross-sectional	in	character.	We	could	perfectly	call	“emergent	fact”	the	category	of	entity	that	emerges	from	the	reconstruction	of	the	relation	between	the	scientific	level	of	physical	arrangements	of	particles	and	the	ordinary	level	of		emerging	properties.	(Cumpa	2014,	p.	322)		Furthermore,	empirical	rules	can	be	given	that	establish	the	existence	of	relationships	between	the	constituents	of	facts	‘in’	the	manifest	and	scientific	images	(Cumpa	2019,	p.	18).	So,	taking	the	example	of	the	table,	we	have:		 (1) Iff	there	is	an	arrangement	of	electrons	behaving	in	a	certain	way,	there	is	a	table	(2) Iff	there	is	an	arrangement	of	photons	behaving	in	a	certain	way,	there	is	the	colour	brown.			 As	Buonomo	remarks,	this	amounts	to	a	form	of	‘constructive	factualism’,	according	to	which	facts	are	scientific	reconstructions	of	their	constituents:	‘It	is	by	recognizing	the	reconstructive	nature	of	facts	that	we	can	understand	the	
explanatory	power	of	this	category	to	account	for	the	relation	between	the	ordinary	world	and	the	physical	universe	…’	(Buonomo	2017).	Thus	we	should	not	situate	the	fact	that	‘the	table	is	brown’	at	the	level	of	the	everyday,	since	although	the	colour	brown	belongs	to	that	level,	the	table,	as	an	arrangement	of	particles,	should	be	regarded	as	sitting	at	the	level	of	the	‘physical	universe’	(ibid.).	It	is	this	distinction	between	the	respective	constituents	that	allows	this	fact	to	bridge	or	intersect	the	two	levels.		 Now	there	is	an	obvious	worry	that	arises	at	this	point:	if	it	is	on	the	basis	of	our	scientific	knowledge	that	we	take	an	object	such	as	a	table	to	be	an	arrangement	of	particles	and	thus	situated	at	the	level	of	the	physical	universe,	why	should	we	not	apply	the	same	methodology	to	the	colour	brown?	Of	course,	colour	science	is	a	complex	field	and	the	colour	of	an	object	is	not	a	simple	matter	of	light	of	a	certain	wavelength	being	reflected	from	it,	but	involves	not	only	the	surface	and	reflecting	properties	of	an	object	but	also,	in	some	cases,	its	emitting	properties,	the	relevant	context,	including	the	colours	of	nearby	objects	(the	presence	of	which	can	generate	numerous	well-known	‘illusions’)	as	well	as	certain	features	of	the	optical	system	and	the	brain.	But	the	point	is,	such	a	story	can	be	given	and	with	the	relevant	details	filled	in,	it	will	be	an	appropriately	explanatory	story,	thereby	satisfy	the	underlying	demand	of	the	cross-sectionality	criterion	(see	Cumpa	2019).	Of	course,	one	could	insist	that	aspects	of	what	we	call	colour,	or	even	colour	itself,	remain	outwith	such	an	account,	insofar	as	they	concern	sensations	or	qualia	or	whatever.	In	that	case,	however,	one	might	hesitate	to	situate	these	aspects	at	the	level	of	the	‘everyday’	and	certainly	such	a	move	would	represent	a	significant	cost	for	this	sort	of	broadly	factualist	account.		 Here’s	another	example	that	further	illustrates	the	concern	and	sharpens	it	in	the	context	of	the	discussion	of	the	Standard	Model	above.	Consider	a	different	property	of	the	table,	one	that	is	tactile	and	just	as	important	as	its	colour,	if	not	more	so,	namely	its	solidity.	The	full	explanation	of	this	is	also	complex,	involving,	of	course,	the	chemical	composition	of	the	table,	the	nature	of	the	constituent	molecules,	the	relationships	between	them	and	so	forth.	But	a	crucial	factor	in	this	explanation	is	the	Pauli	Exclusion	Principle,	credited	with	accounting	for	the	stability	of	matter	in	general	(see	Massimi	2005).	The	principle	is	often	stated	as	requiring	that	electrons	in	an	atom	must	be	assigned	different	‘quantum	numbers’	reflecting	the	fact	that	they	occupy	different	states.	More	generally,	it	is	a	manifestation	of	the	requirement	that	the	wave-function	applicable	to	fermions	–	the	particle	kind	that	includes	electrons	–	must	be	anti-symmetric	under	particle	permutations.	But	this	in	turn	is	just	one	representation	of	Permutation	Symmetry,	another	being	that	wave-	functions	applicable	to	bosons	–	such	as	photons	–	must	be	symmetric	under	permutations	(and	there	are	an	infinite	number	of	other	representations,	corresponding	to	para-statistics	as	mentioned	above).			 Thus,	the	ultimate	explanans,	as	it	were,	in	this	explanatory	story	is	a	fundamental	symmetry	principle.	Adopting	the	same	methodology	as	in	the	case	of	the	table	as	an	object,	we	can	conclude	that	its	property	of	solidity	can	also	be	explanatorily	grounded	in	a	feature	of	the	scientific	universe.	Remaining	within	the	factualist	conception	this	raises	an	immediate	concern	about	the	status	of	the	‘ordinary	world’,	which	is	supposed	to	anchor	one	side	of	the	bridge	furnished	by	the	relevant	facts.	There	are	a	number	of	options	then	open	to	us:	one	is	to	
maintain	a	form	of	reductionism	along	the	following	lines	(Cumpa	2019).	Consider	the	fact	of	the	table	being	brown.	This	has	constituents	in	both	the	scientific	and	‘everyday’	worlds:	in	the	case	of	the	table,	the	two	relata	of	the	reduction	can	be	identified,	since	the	‘everyday’	table	and	the	scientific	one	belong	to	the	‘scientific’	world.	And	of	course,	this	identification	requires	the	existence	of	both	relata.	However,	although	the	colour	brown	is	reducible	to	the	photons	and	the	chemical	make-up	of	the	table	and	so	forth,	it	is	not	identical	with	all	that,	since	colours	do	not	belong	‘in’	the	scientific	world	(ibid.).	The	crucial	point	here,	is	that	as	far	as	the	factualist	is	concerned,	the	property	of	being	brown	is	a	constituent	of	the	fact	of	the	table’s	being	brown,	not	of	the	table	itself.	If	the	latter	were	the	case,	then	the	colour	brown	would	have	to	belong	to	the	same	‘world’	as	the	table	and	we	would	lose	cross-sectionality.		 Note	the	assumption	of	the	existence	of	both	relata,	situated	in	the	‘everyday’	and	‘scientific’	worlds	respectively.	It	is	this	that	requires	the	criterion	of	cross-sectionality	and	the	associated	compex,	albeit	nuanced,	considerations	of	the	constitution	of	facts.	Can	we	find	an	alternative	that	this	metaphysically	less	costly?	Indeed	we	can:	a	form	of	eliminativism	tied	to	an	iterative	methodology	that	assumes	both	relata	to	begin	with	and	then	shows	that	one	can	actually	be	dispensed	with.			 Thus	we	can	argue,	on	the	back	of	the	above	explanatory	story,	that	the	‘ordinary	world’	or	‘everyday’	level	can	be	eliminated	in	favour	of	the	scientific,	or	fundamental	(French	2014):	we	begin	with	an	‘appearance’,	such	as	solidity	that	we	take,	at	first	iteration,	to	be	situated	in	the	‘ordinary	world’	or	at	the	‘everyday’	level;	we	then	apply	the	above	science	based	and	hence	naturalistic	methodology	of	metaphysics	and	explain	this	appearance	in	terms	of,	ultimately,	Permutation	Symmetry;	we	then	take	this	explanation	to	licence	the	elimination	of	solidity	as	a	feature	in	our	metaphysical	pantheon.	Compare	this	to	the	explanation	of	rainbows,	for	example:	we	begin	with	the	appearance	of	multicoloured	entities	in	the	sky,	regarded	at	the	‘everyday’	level	as	things	of	some	kind;	we	then	explain	this	appearance	in	terms	of	the	reflection	and	refraction	of	light,	when	the	eye	and	the	sun	and	water	droplets	are	in	a	certain	alignment;	and	we	may	go	on	to	appeal	to	further	features	of	geometrical	optics	or	catastrophe	theory	or	whatever	(see	Bueno	and	French	2018,	pp.	189-191)	to	flesh	out	the	details	of	our	explanans	and	deepen	the	explanation;	but	at	the	end	of	that	process,	we	end	up	with	a	scientifically	based	explanation	that	effectively	removes	‘rainbows’	from	our	list	of	physical	‘things’.	This	may	appear	extreme	but	it	offers	a	number	of	meta-metaphysical	advantages,	not	least	in	that	it	reduces	the	number	of	levels	(obviously)	and	therefore	also	eliminates	the	need	for	a	criterion	of	cross-sectionality,	as	there	are	no	distinct	levels	to	‘bridge’	or	cross.			 Of	course,	eliminativism	is	not	cost-free.	The	identification	and	hence	elimination	of	‘solidity’	in	favour	of	Permutation	Symmetry	implies	certain	robust	modal	claims,	to	the	effect	that	there	could	be	no	such	property	in	the	absence	of	this	symmetry.	But	in	fact	that	is	what	modern	physics	tells	us	(modulo	theory	change	under	which	this	symmetry	may	be	recovered	‘in	the	limit’,	say).		There	is	also	the	concern	how	to	make	sense	of	statements	apparently	about	‘everyday’	things.	Fortunately	there	are	a	number	of	metaphysical	devices	on	hand	that	we	can	use	(see	French	2014	Ch.	11),	such	as	a	form	of	truth-maker	theory	according	to	which	statements	about	y	are	made	
true	by	x,	without	having	to	take	y	to	exist.	It	may	appear	that	we	have	retained	the	‘everyday’	world,	in	some	sense,	but	the	purpose	of	such	devices	is	not	to	‘bridge’	the	two	worlds	but	to	make	sense	of	statements	that	are	apparently	about	one	of	them.	By	virtue	of	this,	there	remains	no	need	for	such	a	criterion	as	cross-sectionality.			 I’ll	come	back	to	eliminativism	as	I	want	to	press	a	further	point	that	has	to	do	with	the	inclusion	of	such	features	of	the	scientific	world	as	symmetry	principles	as	constituents	in	facts.	Now,	on	the	face	of	it,	there	may	not	seem	to	be	any	in-principle	objection	to	such	a	move.	After	all,	Buonomo,	in	defending	and	extending	Cumpa’s	approach,	accepts	that	the	superposition	of	the	quantum	states	of	the	universe	may	be	included	as	such	a	constituent.	However,	you	might	have	qualms	about	accepting	symmetry	principles	on	the	grounds	that	the	constituent	‘slot’	in	this	case	has	to	be	filled	by	an	element	of	the	physical	universe	that	is	fundamental	and	only	the	so-called	‘basic	building	blocks’	of	the	world,	such	as	particles	or	fields	can	be	fundamental	in	this	sense.	Here	perhaps	we	might	draw	on	alternative	understandings	of	‘fundamentality’	(see	French	forthcoming).		 Thus,	Tahko,	for	example,	has	argued	that	we	should	adopt	such	an	understanding	based	on	the	idea	of	‘ontological	minimality’,	in	the	sense	that	the	fundamental	level	should	simply	be	taken	to	consist	of	ontologically	minimal	elements,	with	no	commitment	to	any	mereological	‘building’	arrangement	(Tahko	2018).	In	the	absence	of	such	a	commitment,	some	other	framework	needs	to	be	appealed	to	in	which	symmetry	principles	can	be	accorded	the	relevant	metaphysical	priority.	It	turns	out	that	relations	of	supervenience	and	dependence	are	not	up	to	the	job	(Wolff	2012,	McKenzie	2014)	but	we	might	appeal	to	the	determinable-determinate	relation	again	(French	2014	Ch.	10)	and	argue	that	this	satisfies	the	cross-sectionality	criterion.	Some	might	balk	at	the	inclusion	of	determinables	in	our	fundamental	level	but	Wilson	(2012)	has	argued	that	such	balking	is	question	begging	and	that	there	is	no	principled	obstacle	to	such	a	move.	There	is	more	to	say	(again,	see	French	forthcoming)	but	hopefully	I’ve	indicated	how	symmetry	principles	can	be	regarded	as	fundamental	constituents	of	facts.		 However,	a	further	issue	is	whether	such	constituents	in	general	can	be	
qualitative.		Thus,	it	might	be	argued	either	that	all	fundamental	facts	must	be	individualistic	facts	in	the	sense	that	they	are	about	or	concern	individuals	or,	at	least,	that	the	facts	that	we	are	concerned	with	here,	namely	facts	that	satisfy	the	cross-sectionality	criterion,	must	be	individualistic	facts.	The	former	seems	a	very	broad	claim	and	here	I’ll	focus	on	the	second.	The	argument	could	run	as	follows3:	as	(many	of)	the	entities	we	are	typically	concerned	with	in	the	‘ordinary	world’	are	individuals,	so	the	constituents	of	the	facts	we	are	concerned	with	in	cross-sectional	situations	should	be	individuals.	Thus	because	the	table	at	which	I	am	sat	is	an	individual,	so	the	constituent	entities	that	are	arranged	to	compose	it	must	be	individuals.	Particles	are	individuals,	so	they	satisfy	this	particular	desideratum,	whereas	symmetry	principles	are	not	and	so	they	don’t.	
																																																								3	As	Cumpa	has	emphasised,	the	criterion	itself	does	not	require	that	the	constituents	of	facts	be	individuals	(email).		
	 Now	that	isn’t	a	particularly	strong	argument	to	begin	with	and	one	might	want	to	insist	that	when	it	comes	to	quantum	mechanics,	the	desideratum	straightforwardly	fails	because	quantum	particles	are	non-individuals	in	some	sense.	On	this	point,	however,	we	have	to	tread	carefully,	since	as	is	now	well-known	it	is	perfectly	compatible	with	quantum	physics	to	adopt	the	view	that	particles	are	individuals	–	there	is	in	effect	a	kind	of	metaphysical	underdetermination	of	these	two	views	by	the	physics	(French	and	Krause	2006).	Thus	someone	determined	to	defend	the	claim	that	the	relevant	facts	must	be	individualistic	facts	could	insist	on	adopting	the	view	of	quantum	particles	as	individuals	and	simply	accept	that	this,	in	effect,	goes	‘beyond’	the	physics.	But	of	course,	someone	who	adopts	the	alternative	view	–	attributed	originally	to	the	likes	of	Born	and	Heisenberg	–	that	quantum	particles	are	non-individuals	could	question	the	argument	itself	and	maintain	that	as	long	as	we	can	give	an	appropriate	account	of	how	non-individual	quantum	particles,	suitably	arranged,	compose	in	some	sense	the	table	at	which	I	am	sat,	there	is	no	obstacle	to	entertaining	facts	that	have	non-individuals	as	their	constituents.4		 More	generally,	Dasgupta	(2009)	has	argued	for	a	‘revisionary	metaphysics’	that	he	calls	‘generalism’,	involving	qualitative	–	that	is	not	individualistic	–	facts.	The	core	of	his	argument	is	that	‘primitive	individuals’	are	what	he	calls	‘danglers’	in	physical	theories,	by	analogy	with	absolute	velocity	in	classical	mechanics	and	as	physically	redundant	and	empirically	undetectable	elements	they	should	be	removed.	Instead	we	should	adopt	a	generalist	metaphysics	according	to	which	facts	are	constructed	out	of	properties	alone	(cf.	Paul	2013).	Now	there’s	an	obvious	problem	with	such	a	metaphysics,	which	has	to	do	with	the	formal	language	in	which	it	can	be	expressed,	given	that	the	standard	understanding	of	the	quantifiers	that	feature	in	classical	logic	is	that	they	range	over	a	domain	of	individuals	(Dasgupta	2009,	p.	50).	This	of	course	is	a	problem	that	many	revisionary	forms	of	metaphysics	have	had	to	face:	the	view	that	holds	that	quantum	particles	are	non-individuals,	for	example,	cannot	avail	itself	of	standard	set-theory	for	similar	reasons	and	hence	alternative	formalisms	such	as	quasi-set	theory	and	qua-set	theory	have	been	developed	(French	and	Krause	2006).5		 Dasgupta	opts	for	an	algebraic	framework	in	which	certain	functors	express	the	relevant	features	of	the	structure	instantiated	by	the	domain	of	properties	(of	general	adicity,	so	including	relations):	so,	for	example,	some	of	them	express	the	conjunction	and	negation	of	properties,	others	express	the	permutation	of	properties,	another	captures	the	idea	of	partially	‘filling’	a	property	as	in	instantiating	its	first	position	and	so	on.	This	allows	him	to	express	a	generalist	metaphysics	in	which	the	fundamental	facts	of	the	world	have	the	form	P0	obtains,	where	P0	is	a	0-place	property	that	may	be	formed	from	more	basic	terms	through	the	application	of	the	above	functors	(2009,	p.	53).	As	he	says,	‘The	generalist	and	the	individualist	therefore	paint	radically	different	pictures	of	the	material	world.	The	individualist	tells	us	that	there	is	a	domain	of	individuals	propertied	and	related	in	a	certain	way;	while	the																																																									4	Providing	such	an	account	is	a	non-trivial	task.	Granted	that	facts	might	be	taken	to	have	a	non-mereological	form	of	composition	(Cumpa	2019),	there	remains	the	issue	of	articulating	that	form	such	that	it	tracks	both	the	scientific	and	non-standard	set-theoretic	details.	5	Indeed,	much	of	the	discussion	surrounding	Dasgupta’s	proposal	retreads	issues	that	have	previously	appeared	in	considerations	of	identity	and	individuality	in	quantum	physics.	
generalist	tells	us	that	there	are	states	of	affairs	that	obtain,	where	these	states	of	affairs	are	composed	purely	out	of	properties.	’	(ibid.,	p.	54)	And	just	how	radical	the	generalist	picture	is	can	be	seen	once	we	appreciate	what	Dasgupta	calls	its	‘holistic’	flavour	(which	may	be	compared	with	certain	forms	of	monism):		‘When	I	see	my	laptop	and	my	cup	on	the	table,	I	intuitively	see	the	situation	as	being	composed	of	many	facts:	my	laptop	being	on	the	table,	my	cup	being	on	the	table,	and	so	on.	Add	these	facts	up,	I	naturally	think,	and	you	get	the	entire	situation.	But	according	to	generalism	this	is	an	illusion:	the	situation	is	fundamentally	speaking	a	single	whole.	Indeed,	generalism	implies	the	striking	claim	that,	fundamentally	speaking	at	least,	there	is	only	One	Great	Fact	that	captures	our	entire	world	all	at	once!	’	(ibid.,	p.	56)			 What	about	statements	that	apparently	refer	to	individuals,	such	as	those	we	typically	make	about	entities	in	the	‘everyday’	world?	As	Dasgupta	notes,	there	are	various	options:	a	form	of	error	theory,	according	to	which	such	statements	are	strictly	false,	or	fictionalism,	according	to	which	they	are	true	of	the	fiction	that	there	are	individuals,	or	reductionism,	according	to	which	they	actually	refer	to	more	fundamental	facts,	such	as	those	expressed	in	the	generalist	picture,	and	so	on	(ibid.,	p.	54).	As	in	the	case	of	the	truth-maker	theory	briefly	touched	on	above,	Dasgupta	insists	that	the	cost	of	deploying	such	devices	is	more	than	compensated	for	by	the	ontological	parsimony	that	results	from	eliminating	primitive	individuals	(ibid.,	p.	57;	cf	again	Paul	2013).6			 Let	us	consider	the	core	idea	that	‘primitive	individuals’	are	‘danglers’	in	the	sense	of	being	physically	redundant	and	empirically	undetectable.	A	little	care	needs	to	be	taken	here:	first,	with	what	is	intended	by	‘primitive	individuals’	and	secondly	with	the	physical	context	in	which	they	are	taken	to	be	redundant.			 So,	to	begin,	if	by	‘primitive	individuality’	is	meant	something	like	primitive	thisness	or	haecceities	or,	to	relate	back	to	our	earlier	discussion,	some	form	of	substance,	then	the	idea	that	these	are	explanatorily	idle,	as	Turner	(2014)	characterizes	it,	represents	nothing	new,	as	similar	claims	have	been	made	in	the	past	(for	a	historical	overview,	see	French	and	Krause	2006).	And	of	course	this	should	come	as	no	surprise	insofar	as	terms	like	haecceity,	primitive	thisness	or	substance	do	not	(typically)	feature	in	our	scientific	theories,	alongside	terms	like	‘electron’	or	‘electromagnetic	field’	or	‘charge’	and	so	on.	The	former	count	as	metaphysics,	unlike	the	latter,	although	of	course	where	to	draw	the	line	can	be	a	tricky	proposition.	Indeed,	even	if	it	is	granted	that	physics	does	not	care	whether	we	explicate	the	notion	of	individuality	via	that	of	primitive	thisness	or	some	account	or	substance,	or	whatever,	it	is	generally	accepted	that,	as	far	as	classical	physics	is	concerned	anyway,	electrons,	say,	are	individual	objects.	Dasgupta’s	argument	is	that	even	in	the	classical	context,	the	notion	of	individuality	that	is	appealed	to	here	is	explanatorily	idle	and	is	thus	a	‘dangler’.	Lets	briefly	consider	how	the	argument	proceeds.			 It	begins	with	an	analogy	with	absolute	velocity.	Thus,	he	writes,	‘…I	think	we	should	reject	primitive	individuals	for	the	same	reason	that	contemporary	orthodoxy	rejects	absolute	velocity:	our	best	physical	theories	imply	that	they																																																									6	There	are	further	costs	associated	with	the	algebraic	language	that	Dasgupta	proposes	(Turner	2014).		
are	physically	redundant	and	empirically	undetectable.’	(op.	cit.,	p.	37).	Rehearsing	a	line	of	argument	that	according	to	the	laws	of	Newtonian	mechanics	no	measuring	device	could	be	constructed	that	would	detect	absolute	velocity,	he	concludes	that	it	is	empirically	undetectable.	Furthermore,	it	is	part	of	that	argument	that	differences	in	absolute	velocity	at	one	time	do	not	give	rise	to	any	other	differences	at	later	times	and	hence	it	is	physically	redundant	as	well.	Thus	absolute	velocity	counts	as	a	‘dangler’	(Turner	prefers	the	term	‘idler’;	2014).				 Dasgupta	then	mounts	a	similar	argument	to	conclude	that	primitive	individuals	are	also	danglers.	He	begins	by	noting	that	according	to	the	laws	of	Newtonian	mechanics,	two	particles	with	the	same	mass,	charge	and	so	on,	launched	from	the	same	spot	with	the	same	initial	velocity	and	subject	to	the	same	forces	will	follow	the	same	trajectory.	Hence	he	concludes	that	differences	in	individualistic	facts	at	a	certain	time	do	not	give	rise	to	any	differences	at	later	times	–	in	particular	they	do	not	give	rise	to	any	differences	in	general	facts.	But	of	course	this	is	simply	because	the	laws	of	Newtonian	mechanics	do	not	pertain	to,	latch	onto	or	however	you	want	to	put	it,	the	individuality	of	the	particles	–	it	is	only	their	relevant	properties	that	matter.			 Furthermore	he	argues	that	primitive	individuals	are	empirically	undetectable,	beginning	by	noting	that	if,	unbeknownst	to	us,	a	certain	individual	were	permuted	with	another	with	exactly	the	same	properties	we	could	not	tell	the	difference.	And	given	the	laws	of	physics	it	is	impossible	to	build	any	device	that	could	distinguish	between	these	two	situations,	precisely	because	primitive	individuals	are	physically	redundant	(ibid.,	pp.	42-43;	this	is	why	Dasgupta	reverses	the	order	of	consideration	as	compared	to	absolute	velocity,	beginning	here	with	physical	redundancy).	Now	you	might	think	that	again,	empirical	undetectability	simply	follows	from	the	metaphysical	nature	of	primitive	individuality	–	of	course	it	is	redundant	and	undetectable	because	as	a	piece	of	metaphysics	it	is	not	related	to	the	empirical	substructures	of	our	theories	in	the	way	that	theoretical	terms	are.7	However,	further	care	needs	to	be	taken	at	this	point.	Suppose	we	include	among	our	physical	theories,	classical	statistical	mechanics	(as	we	should!)?	In	that	case,	Dasgupta’s	permutation	argument	does	not	go	through:	even	though	the	objects	concerned	are	indiscernible	such	that	we	could	not	tell	the	difference,	the	permutation	makes	a	difference	–	indeed,	putting	things	rather	crudely,	it	is	the	counting	of	such	permutations	that	lies	at	the	heart	of	so-called	Maxwell-Boltzmann	statistics	that	underpins	thermodynamics.			 Things	look	different	in	the	quantum	context,	of	course.	There	–	again,	putting	it	crudely	–	permutations	are	not	counted,	a	feature	that	is	expressed	by	means	of	the	principle	of	Permutation	Symmetry	as	discussed	above	and	which	leads	to	very	different	kinds	of	particle	statistics,	such	as	the	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	cases	already	mentioned.	It	was	on	the	back	of	this	that	physicists	argued	that	individuality	must	be	abandoned	in	the	quantum	context.	This	could																																																									7	Turner	raises	concerns	about	the	algebraic	formalism	that	Dasgupta	employs	to	express	his	generalism,	to	the	effect	that	it	is	more	complex	than	standard	logical	formalisms	and	hence	there	is	a	trade-off	in	choosing	to	eliminate	danglers/idlers	(2014).	We	might	useful	compare	this	concern	to	similar	worries	about	choosing	the	non-individuals	+	quasi-set	theory	‘package’	over	individuals	+	standard	set	theory	in	the	quantum	context.	For	further	discussion	see	Dasgupta	and	Turner	(2014).			
be	taken	to	vindicate	Dasgupta’s	generalist	thesis	but	note,	first	of	all,	that	the	thesis	in	this	case	would	not	be	based	on	a	misguided	analogy	with	absolute	velocity	but	would	be	grounded	in	the	specifics	of	quantum	statistics.8	Secondly,	however,	as	we’ve	just	noted,	quantum	statistics	is	compatible	with	regarding	the	particles	as	individuals	–	you	just	have	to	understand	Permutation	Symmetry	a	certain	way	(French	and	Krause	2006).	Of	course,	Dasgupta	might	insist	that	such	compatibility	does	not	mean	that	the	notion	of	individuality	is	not	a	‘dangler’	in	this	context;	indeed,	the	very	fact	that	there	is	this	metaphysical	underdetermination	between	quantum	particles-as-individuals	and	quantum	particles-as-non-individuals	suggests	that	it	really	does	not	matter	which	we	choose	as	far	as	the	physics	is	concerned,	and	hence	individuality	is	physically	redundant.		 Nevertheless,	picking	the	other	‘horn’	of	the	metaphysical	dilemma	also	comes	with	costs	–	namely	that	of,	first,	explicating	metaphysically	what	one	means	by	‘non-individuality’	and	secondly,	elaborating	an	appropriate	formal	framework	for	this	‘package’	(French	and	Krause	2006;	cf.	Turner’s	concerns,	again,	about	the	costs	of	generalism;	2014).	The	appropriate	response,	I	would	suggest,	is	to	avoid	having	to	entertain	such	‘danglers’	and	also	having	to	pay	such	costs	by	rejecting	both	packages	and	withdraw	from	object-oriented	metaphysics	entirely.	I’ll	come	back	to	that	shortly	when	I	introduce	structuralism.		 Before	I	do,	its	also	worth	noting	the	further	point	that	dismissing	individuality	as	redundant	in	the	quantum	context	is	a	little	quick.	It	might	seem	plausible	if	we’re	only	thinking	in	terms	of	haecceities	or	substance	or	the	line,	but	a	‘physics-appropriate’	form	of	individuality	can	be	constructed	in	this	context	by	means	of	the	(Quinean)	notion	of	‘weak	discernibility’	(Muller	and	Saunders	2008).	The	idea	is	that	two	individuals	can	be	said	to	be	weakly	discernible	if	they	enter	into	irreflexive	relations	of	the	form	‘…	has	different	P	from	…’,	where	P	is	some	predicate.	Since	two	fermions	in	a	singlet	state,	say,	must	possess	different	spins	(one	will	have	spin	‘up’,	the	other	spin	‘down’)	they	can	be	said	to	enter	into	such	a	relation	and	hence	are	weakly	discernible	and	individuals	in	this	sense.	One	can	understand	this	approach	as	offering	a	further	means	of	articulating	the	quantum	particles-as-individuals	package	but	insofar	as	the	individuality	is	grounded	not	in	some	metaphysical	notion	of	primitive	thisness	or	whatever	but	in	certain	relations	holding	between	the	particles	in	a	certain	state,	one	might	struggle	to	claim	that	it	is	physically	redundant.		 Now,	this	obviously	suggests	some	form	of	‘bundle	theory’	of	individuals,	which	takes	them	to	be	nothing	other	than	bundles	of	properties,	typically	conceived	of	as	universals,	including,	in	this	version,	relations	(and	it	is	because	the	relevant	relations	are	manifested	in	physical	situations	such	as	the	singlet	state	that	this	account	evades	Dasgupta’s	arguments	to	do	with	physical	redundancy	and	empirical	undetectability).	Dasgupta	rejects	the	bundle	theory	(2009,	pp.	47-49),	but	here	again,	some	care	must	be	taken.	The	reason	for	this	rejection	has	to	do	with	the	Principle	of	Identity	of	Indiscernibles,	required	by																																																									8	Saunders	has	argued	that	the	Gibbs	Paradox	shows	that	individuality	should	be	abandoned	even	in	the	context	of	classical	statistical	mechanics	(2006).	Alternatively	one	could	take	the	paradox	as	a	kind	of	‘footprint’	within	the	latter	of	the	forthcoming	‘new’	quantum	statistics	(French	and	Krause	2006).	For	a	truly	physics	based	form	of	generalism,	see	Saunders	2018.	
bundle	theories	as	a	metaphysical	guarantor	against	the	possibility	of	two	individuals	sharing	the	same	bundle	of	properties.	As	Dasgupta	notes,	the	Principle	restricts	the	scope	of	possibilities	that	we	may	entertain	(indeed,	that	was	its	original	purpose	as	far	as	Leibniz	was	concerned!)	and,	as	usually	expressed,	it	clashes	with	quantum	mechanics	(French	and	Krause	2006).	However,	as	usually	expressed	the	scope	of	the	Principle	does	not	extend	to	the	kinds	of	irreflexive	relations	appealed	to	in	the	above	account	and	it	turns	out	that	a	form	of	the	Principle,	as	suitably	extended,	can	be	constructed	that	is	compatible	with	modern	physics	(Saunders	2003).	Thus	the	bundle	approach	should	not	be	dismissed	quite	so	quickly.		 Having	said	all	of	that,	Dasgupta’s	approach	does	open	the	door	to	a	kind	of	qualitative	factualism	that,	with	a	little	work,	can	be	made	to	mesh	nicely	with	modern	physics.	Pushing	the	door	open	even	further	we	might	then	include	symmetry	principles	such	as	those	canvassed	above	in	our	fundamental	qualitative	basis.	Indeed,	this	is	what	recent	forms	of	structuralism	have	suggested.		
The	Structuralist	Perspective	In	very	general	terms,	structuralism	has	been	characterised	as	advocating	a	shift	from	thinking	about	the	world	in	terms	of	objects	to	thinking	about	it	in	terms	of	
structures	(Ladyman	2014).	As	so	characterised,	albeit	quite	crudely,	it	can	obviously	be	understood	as	standing	in	opposition	to	substantialism.	What	powers	the	shift	to	structures,	at	least	in	part,	is	reflection	on	the	above	metaphysical	underdetermination	between	the	two	‘packages’	of	particles-as-individuals	and	particles-as-non-individuals,	understood	as	motivating	the	ejection	of	objects	from	our	fundamental	metaphysical	pantheon	(Ladyman	1998).	Further	reflection	on	the	nature	of	the	theories	of	modern	physics	and	in	particular	on	the	role	of	symmetry	principles	then	helps	us	get	a	grip	on	what	is	meant	by	structure	in	this	context.	Thus,	following	Cassirer	(1936)	the	structuralist	can	say	that	it	is	the	interlocking	‘Parmenidean	sphere’	of	symmetries	and	laws,	with	specific	measurement	outcomes	acting	as	‘existential	witnesses’	in	Wilson’s	sense	(Wilson	2012),	pinning	down	the	range	of	possibilities	covered	by	such	principles	to	this	one,	the	structure	of	the	actual	world	(French	2014).		 So,	to	be	more	specific,	Permutation	Symmetry	is	a	feature	of	the	structure	of	all	physically	possible	worlds,	covering	those	that	include	paraparticles,	but	the	structure	of	this	world	is	delineated	by	Bose-Einstein	and	Fermi-Dirac	statistics,	yielding	the	most	fundamental	kinds,	namely	bosons	and	fermions	respectively.		The	latter	act	as	‘existential	witnesses’	in	the	above	sense	and	their	relationship	to	the	symmetry	that	lies	in	the	fundamental	base	can	be	described	in	terms	of	that	of	determinates	to	determinables.			 Such	a	stance	can	easily	be	seen	to	be	compatible	with	(qualitative)	factualism,	as	hinted	at	above.	Instead	of	particles	as	constituents,	however,	we	would	have	symmetries	and	laws.	Furthermore,	cross-sectionality	can	still	be	satisfied,	insofar	as	the	other	constituent	‘slot’	in	the	fact	could	be	filled	by	‘everyday’	properties,	such	as	solidity	for	example.	As	indicated	previously,	the	latter	is	explained,	ultimately,	by	Permutation	Symmetry	(see	French	and	Saatsi	2018)	and	so	the	fact	<Permutation	Symmetry,	solidity>	bridges	the	scientific	and	‘everyday’	worlds	in	a	way	that	satisfies	Cumpa’s	Criterion.		
	 However,	it	is	certainly	not	necessary	for	the	structuralist	to	also	be	a	factualist.	She	could	resist	such	an	identification,	on	the	well-ground	grounds	but	in	particular	for	reasons	of	ontological	economy.	The	eliminativist	structuralist	especially,	might	insist	that	having	eliminated	the	‘everyday’	world,	she	is	in	no	metaphysical	mood	to	entertain	‘facts’	as	further	elements	of	her	metaphysical	pantheon.	Indeed,	she	may	well	ask	what	it	is	that	they	‘bring	to	the	table’!	Standardly	the	factualist	response	is	to	emphasise	the	role	of	facts	in	explanations	and	the	way	they	function	as	the	locus	of	modality.	I	don't	have	space	to	go	into	the	details	of	the	relevant	debate	but	the	non-factualist	structuralist	can	argue	that	what	is	doing	the	explaining	when	it	comes	to	the	solidity	of	my	table,	say,	is	not	Permutation	Symmetry	as	a	constituent	of	a	fact	but	simply	Permutation	Symmetry	as	a	physical	feature	of	the	world.	That	is	what	is	cited	as	the	explanans	in	the	usual	scientific	accounts.	Couching	it	in	terms	of	a	‘fact’	appears	to	add	little	to	such	accounts;	at	best,	such	a	move	only	adds	a	further	descriptive	gloss	from	which	we	cannot	straightforwardly	infer	ontological	significance.			 As	for	modality,	the	Humean	structuralist	will	join	her	fellows	in	maintaining	that	any	modality	is	‘in’	the	models.	The	non-Humean	may	argue	that	it	is	‘in’	the	world	but	again	it	is	not	necessary	for	her	to	ascribe	it	to	‘facts’,	taken	as	features	of	her	ontology.	She	may,	for	example,	extend	a	‘primitivist’	account	of	laws	to	symmetries	and	argue	that	these	are	likewise	‘modally	informed’	(French	2014).	We	can	illustrate	this	with,	yet	again,	Permutation	Symmetry,	which,	as	we’ve	noted,	allows	for	options	other	than	the	standard	forms	of	quantum	statistics.	Taking	this	mathematical	‘surplus	structure’	as	representing	possible	physical	features	of	the	world	we	can	ascribe	a	certain	‘power’	or	‘potentiality’	to	the	symmetry,	drawing	on	recent	analyses	of	these	notions	(Vetter	2015).	In	this	respect	the	modal	structuralist	account	bears	a	certain	resemblance	to	the	kind	of	dispositionalism	favoured	by	the	substantialist,	but	of	course	with	the	‘seat’	of	modality	shifted	from	objects	to	structures.			 Finally,	it	is	also	this	aspect	of	symmetries	that	underpin	the	counterfactual	considerations	appealed	to	in	explications	of	the	explanations	they	play	a	role	in:	the	different	possibilities	encompassed	by	these	symmetries	allow	us	to	entertain	‘what	if	things	had	been	different?’	scenarios	that	track	the	metaphysical	dependencies	relating	the	explanans	and	explanandum	as	physical	features	of	the	world	(French	and	Saatsi	2018).		 In	this	manner,	then,	among	others,	structuralism	may	offer	a	‘third	way’	between	substantialism	and	factualism.	There	is	of	course	much	more	to	be	said,	some	of	which	will	involve	very	general	issues	going	far	beyond	the	scope	of	this	essay.	However,	I	would	argue	that	this	is	an	avenue	worth	exploring,	both	for	its	contrasts	and	comparisons	with	the	alternatives.					
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